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Set in the context of the recent theoretical and policy debates on appropriate exchange 
rate regimes for emerging market economies in a world of free capital mobility, the 
paper attempts to present the case for an intermediate exchange rate regime, drawing on 
recent theoretical and empirical literatures on behavioural finance and currency market 
structures; and to examine empirically the experiences and evolution of Brazil’s foreign 
exchange market under different exchange rate regimes.  
After a brief review of the policy debates, we discuss theoretical discourses on 
appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies, drawing on both  
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macroeconomic propositions and microeconomic market perspectives. Next, we discuss 
empirical studies of currency market conditions with focus on the most recent 
applications of behavioural finance models to currency markets. We emphasize the 
importance of endogenizing structures of market conditions in our consideration of 
appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies, presenting 
hypotheses for empirical tests, methodology adopted and empirical results, and briefly 
conclude with final remarks. 
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1 Introduction 
For any small open economy, exchange rates are universally regarded as the key relative 
price to determining its macroeconomic configuration. However, a question as to what 
constitutes the appropriate or optimal exchange rate regime for developing countries 
and emerging market economies has long been in the domain of intense debates among 
academics and policymakers alike. The choice of the exchange rate regime is complicated 
because the exchange rate policy affects both external balance and internal balance in 
terms of macroeconomic adjustment as a stabilization instrument as well as an 
expenditure-switching policy instrument. In turn, as expenditure-switching policy, the 
exchange rate policy influences not only net external trade balances through the 
competitiveness of tradable goods but also the internal resource allocation between 
tradables and nontradables through changes in the real exchange rates.  
In the earlier debate, this dual role of exchange rate policy had given rise to two distinct 
approaches to an appropriate exchange regime among development macroeconomists 
(Agénor and Montiel 1996):  
–  the real target approach with a focus on the need to keep international 
competitiveness of tradable goods so as to ensure a viable and sustainable 
position in the current account;  
–  the  nominal anchor approach with a focus on the need to ensure domestic 
monetary stability.  
Setting targets in real terms, the first approach is geared for the attainment of external 
balance. In order for exchange rates to satisfy the real targets over time in the face of 
various real shocks to the external balance, the approach opts for a regime that provides 
a greater flexibility to the exchange rate. In contrast, the second approach opts for a 
regime that brings a greater stability to nominal variables in order to ensure financial 
discipline.  
Seen in this perspective, there is an inherent tension between two approaches. 
Therefore, the practical policy issue is then over the trade-off between the two 
objectives, and hence, the relative weight that should be assigned to each of these 
objectives in formulating exchange rate policy. Ultimately, it can be said that optimal 
management of exchange rates for a given economy depends on the policymakers’ 
objectives, the source of macroeconomic shocks, and its structural characteristics and 
special circumstances of an economy. For example, for a developing country whose 
external position imposes a binding constraint for economic growth, it may be of utmost 
importance to give particular attention to the current account target in relation to its 
developmental objectives such as the need to develop non-traditional exports in its 
efforts to diversify its trade structure away from the commodity-dependence and the 
vulnerability associated with it. Such a developmental perspective would inevitably 
raise a critical question as to whether it is possible to define the fundamental 
equilibrium real exchange rate at a point of time.1 If this is feasible, one can proceed to 
                                                 
1   For example, Williamson (1994) set a quest for understanding the fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (FEER), by defining it in the Keynesian tradition but in an abstract form, as ‘the real effective 
exchange rate compatible with simultaneous achievement of internal and external balance in the medium 
term’. 2 
examine how different exchange rate regimes affect the level and path of the real 
exchange rate relative to such a benchmark value and trajectory,  
Given a variety of these policy considerations discussed above, there are several 
grounds to argue that intermediate regimes such as a target zone or crawling band 
system may be one of best options for many developing, emerging market economies, 
as they combine elements of both ‘flexibility’ and ‘stability’. In theory, they could 
provide some scope for an independent monetary policy in a world of free capital 
mobility, as adjustment within the band permits the exchange rate to bear a part of the 
burden of absorbing unanticipated real and monetary shocks. They could also 
potentially provide an anchor for monetary stability because certain monetary discipline 
is required to keep the exchange rate within the band. In practice, a central issue to 
resolve for sustaining any intermediate regime, however is how to establish the 
credibility of policymakers’ commitment to such exchange rate regimes. 
Indeed, it is on this credibility issue that the prospect for an ‘intermediate regime 
option’ was severely tested and challenged when a series of currency and financial 
crises plagued many emerging market economies in the 1990s. By the early 2000s, there 
emerged a new consensus—the two corner solution view—as a dominant position in the 
debate on the appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies prone 
to financial crises. Resorting to the ‘impossible trinity thesis, this view argues that 
intermediate regimes are not viable under financial globalization, because of their 
vulnerability to speculative attacks (self-fulfilling or otherwise). It is argued that under a 
floating regime, the monetary stability can be ensured, without having exchange rate-
based stabilization in place, by adopting an inflation-targeting framework and some 
variations of the Taylor rule as a policy guide (Taylor 2001). 
However, as Frankel (1999) suggests, the inconsistent trinity thesis does not, in 
principle, imply that countries cannot have a half-independent monetary policy and a 
half-fixed exchange rate by adopting intermediate regimes such as a target zone; nor 
does it imply that countries cannot have both an independent monetary policy and a 
fixed exchange rate by imposing effective capital controls. In reality, the ‘fear of 
floating’ has been prevalent among emerging market economies (Calvo and Reinhart 
2002). Even among the emerging economies of East Asia, many of which managed to 
stage a quick recovery from the devastating Asian crisis of 1997-98, we find a 
continuing adherence to the East Asian dollar pegged regimes (McKinnon and Schnabl 
2004). Given their bitter experiences with currency attacks and collapses, in order to 
surmount the fear over the loss of the credibility towards their pegged regimes, many 
emerging economies have, instead, opted to hold large amounts of international reserves 
for self-insurance purposes, far in excess of any foreseen shortfalls stemming from the 
needs for current account transactions (Jeanne 2007; Miller and Zhang 2007).  
At the same time, as we argue elsewhere in relation to the effect of the currency 
transaction tax (CTT) on market liquidity and efficiency (Nissanke 2005), the discourse 
on the appropriate exchange rate regime, in particular, on the desirability or the 
feasibility of policy-based interventions in currency markets is closely related and 
shaped by varied perceptions economists hold about how well and efficiently currency 
markets function without intervention. A critical question debated in this regard is 
whether speculators or noise traders make exchange rates excessively more volatile than 
warranted by fundamentals.  3 
Set in the context of these theoretical and policy debates on appropriate exchange rate 
regimes for emerging market economies in a world of free capital mobility, the primary 
objectives of this paper are: (i) to present the case for an intermediate exchange rate 
regime, drawing on recent theoretical and empirical literatures on behavioural finance 
and currency market structures; and (ii) to examine empirically the experiences and 
evolution of Brazil’s foreign exchange market under alternative exchange rate regimes. 
Brazil switched from a managed band to market-based floating regime after 
experiencing a speculative currency attack at the end of 1998. Since then the central 
bank has followed an inflation-targeting regime, under which exchange rate movements 
should only enter the bank’s objective function if at odds with its inflation target. In this 
sense, we hope that our comparative empirical analysis of Brazil’s foreign exchange 
market under different exchange rate regimes will yield some valuable insights into how 
foreign exchange markets are structured and performed in an era of financial 
globalization, as the outcome of interactive forces among heterogeneous market 
traders/participants as well as between market traders on the one hand and the central 
bank on the other.  
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, for building a solid case for intermediate 
exchange rate regimes, we discuss theoretical discourses on appropriate exchange rate 
regimes for emerging market economies, drawing on both macroeconomic propositions 
and microeconomic market perspectives. In section 3, we discuss empirical studies of 
currency market conditions with a focus on the most recent applications of behavioural 
finance models to currency markets. We emphasize the importance of endogenizing 
structures of market conditions in our consideration of appropriate exchange rate 
regimes for emerging market economies. Section 4 presents the hypotheses for 
empirical tests, the methodology adopted and the empirical results. Finally, our brief 
concluding remarks are offered in section 5. 
2 Theoretical  discourse 
2.1  The possible trinity: the case for an intermediate exchange rate regime 
from a macroeconomic perspective  
As financial globalization has accelerated, discussions on appropriate exchange rate 
regimes for emerging markets economies in macroeconomic literature have increasingly 
been framed in relation to the infamous theoretical proposition of ‘impossible trinity 
thesis’. The thesis stipulates that policymakers in open economies face a 
macroeconomic trilemma: that is, whilst policymakers typically have three desirable 
objectives (exchange rate stability, free international capital mobility, and monetary 
policy independence to engage domestic economic goals), they are in practice forced to 
give up one objective, since only two out of the three can be mutually consistent. 
Resorting to this thesis, it is argued that the only exchange rate regimes that remain 
viable in an era of free cross-border capital mobility are the two corners positions within 
the trinity, i.e. either pure floating or hard pegs. Hence, this position is referred to in the 
literature as the two-corner view on the exchange rate regime, but also known as the 
hollowing out hypothesis or the bi-polar view. For example, Eichengreen (1999: 134) 
concludes that, ‘a middle ground of pegged but adjustable exchange rates and exchange 
rate target zones will hollow out and policymakers will be confronted with a choice 
between floating and monetary union’.  4 
However, it should be noted that this debate on appropriate exchange rate regimes is 
driven by the imperative of financial globalization. The arguments rest on the 
assumption that financial openness alone should not be challenged in the trinity, either 
because of the considerable benefits which openness is promised to produce in 
emerging economies, or because free capital mobility is inevitable due to changes in 
global technology, market structure or politics. While the impossible trinity thesis 
applies to any open economy, developed mature economies or emerging market 
economies alike, the policy constraint posed is seen as particularly severe for the latter 
group, reflecting their disadvantaged position in global finance. As Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (1999) note, emerging market economies are handicapped by the original sin 
due to incomplete domestic financial markets as an additional source of financial 
fragility that makes them more susceptible to global financial and currency crises.2 
Indeed, the financial fragility and instability of emerging market economies is closely 
related to their asymmetric position vis-à-vis advanced countries in international finance 
as well to their structural characteristics. As Bordo and Flandreau (2001) note, the 
degree of financial maturity—the ability to issue international securities denominated in 
own domestic currency—is a key factor in distinguishing core countries from periphery 
ones for exchange rate regime choices over the past century. The prevalence of their 
‘fear of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart 2000) or ‘the case of hard pegs’ (Calvo 2000) is 
also closely related to:  
i)  liability dollarization, i.e., the condition in which financial contracts are 
expressed in foreign currency;  
ii)  fear of inflation due to the high pass-through coefficients (measurements of the 
speed of transmission of devaluation to inflation); and  
iii)  their nascent capital markets.  
Despite the strong case made by many influential macroeconomists for the two-polar 
view (e.g., Fisher 2001), Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005) show that intermediate 
regimes have actually proved the most resilient over recent years  
2.2  Agents’ behaviour and market conditions: the case for an intermediate 
exchange rate regime from a microeconomic perspective 
In mainstream economic thought, the exchange rate is considered a relative price, which 
restores equilibrium in real or financial markets. As such, exchange rate movements can 
only result from changes in underlying ‘fundamentals’, which require an adjustment in 
relative prices (Harvey 2001). While in the long run, the need for a balanced current 
account determines the exchange rate, asset market considerations, such as differential 
money supplies or interest rates, are acknowledged to predominate in the short  run. 
                                                 
2   The original sin hypothesis advanced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999: 3) refers to ‘a situation in 
which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term even 
domestically. In the presence of this incompleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because of all 
domestic investments will have either a currency mismatch … or maturity mismatch …’. Critically, as 
they note, these mismatches exist not because banks and firms lack either the prudence to hedge their 
currency exposures or the foresight to maturity mismatch, but because they are unable to do so due to 
their ‘emerging markets’ status. 5 
However, along with the acknowledgement of asset market consideration (and the 
search for micro foundations in neoclassical economics) came the incorporation of 
agents’ expectations and behaviour in exchange rate theory, which has shaped the 
policy debate on appropriate exchange rate regimes from this microeconomic 
perspective.  
Those who argue that any intervention in currency markets would reduce market 
efficiency tend to treat traders and speculators as rational agents, i.e., informed investors 
guided by their expectations about future underlying fundamentals. That is, as 
traditional fundamentalists or ‘informed’ traders, market participants are seen to keep 
the exchange rate in line with macroeconomic fundamentals and help stabilize markets 
around a new equilibrium. Traders whose judgments of an asset’s value are sufficiently 
mistaken lose money to arbitrageurs and so eventually disappear from the market. 
Hence, they argue that destabilizing trading cannot be profitable (Friedman 1953; Fama 
1965).  
In this view, foreign exchange markets work efficiently in the sense that the price of the 
exchange rate will reflect all relevant information about the fundamental variables that 
determine its value. The implications for exchange rate policy are clear: as markets 
work efficiently, freely floating exchange rates will generate the pareto-optimal solution 
and any form of government intervention can only be distortionary.  
In contrast, those who see the case for intervention in currency markets argue that 
markets function inefficiently. For example, Frankel (1996) notes that speculative 
bubbles—a deviation from the value justified by fundamentals—are generated, as noise 
traders (as opposed to traditional fundamentalists or informed traders) follow the herd 
in the face of uncertainty.3 In their analyses, a critical distinction is usually made 
between informed traders and noise traders: while informed traders act on homogeneous 
rational expectation, noise traders make their decisions on the basis of ‘fads’ which are 
unrelated to fundamentals.  
In this context, Jeanne and Rose (1999) suggest that whilst the volatility in exchange 
rates is generated both by fundamentals and noise, the source of excessive exchange rate 
volatility (i.e., speculative bubbles) is attributed to the presence of noise traders. In 
particular, their model shows that noise traders are attracted to the market in search for a 
risk premium, and that as the number of noise traders increases, so does the volatility of 
exchange rates.  
Overall, these model support the view that speculators, acting on fads or guided by 
extrapolative expectations at short-term horizon, can exert destabilizing effects on 
markets and ‘overshooting of the overshooting equilibrium’ takes place. Furthermore, 
not only do deviations from the rational stabilizing speculator exist, but they can—
contrary to Friedman’s reasoning—also be profitable and have a lasting impact on 
financial sector prices.  
                                                 
3   Keynes (1936/1997) uses a ‘beauty contest’ analogy to describe fund managers’ herd behaviour, in 
that they must guess in an instant how other market players will interpret a new event and follow them 
accordingly. 6 
3  The importance of endogenizing market structure 
3.1 Behavioural  finance   
The role of agents’ expectations and behaviour in the price formation process is more 
explicitly modelled in the relatively recent behavioural finance approach.4 In this 
literature, exchange rate dynamics are the result of the interaction of heterogeneous 
agents in the foreign exchange market, where for one group of agents the assumption of 
rationality is abandoned.  
Recurring to experimental results and evidence from psychology, sociology and 
organizational behaviour, the behavioural finance approach acknowledges that agents 
are not rational, not only constrained by the availability of information, but differ in 
their ability to absorb, understand and process information. This induces agents to use 
simple rules (‘heuristics’) to guide their behaviour. One such trading rule is positive 
feedback trading or trend chasing, where past prices are extrapolated in the future.5 
Agents do this not because they are stupid or irrational, but because the complexity of 
the world is overwhelming, making it pointless to understand it completely (De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi 2006). The widespread use of chartism/technical trading6, momentum 
trading or the evidence of herding in financial markets, could be characterized by such a 
trading rule (e.g., Galati and Melvin 2005).  
Formally,  
t t t c s s E Δ = Δ + β ) ( 1 ,  (1) 
where, E  is an expectations operator, s is the exchange rate and β  is the extrapolation 
parameter (De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006: 15).7 Such extrapolative expectations or 
positive feedback trading, however, act destabilizing, driving the price of an asset away 
from its fundamental value. 
In many of these models, a second group of traders, rational traders or fundamentalists, 
acting like Friedman’s stabilizing speculator, counteract these destabilizing forces and 
                                                 
4   This exposition is primarily based on the seminal paper by Frankel and Froot (1990) and the recent 
application and extension of this framework to the foreign exchange market by de Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006). Other contributions include Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Lux and Marchesi 
(2000) and Farmer and Joshi (2002). Westerhoff (2003) and Xu (2005) explicitly focus on the foreign 
exchange market.  
5  Other strategies that depend on extrapolative expectations are ‘stop loss’ orders, which prescribe 
selling after a certain level of losses, regardless of future prospects, and portfolio insurance, which 
involves buying more stocks (to raise exposure to risk) when prices rise and selling stocks (to cut 
exposure to risk) when prices fall (Shleifer and Summers 1990: 28).  
6  In practice, trading strategies followed by technical traders might be more complex than a mere 
feedback rule (see e.g., Schulmeister 2006). However, the important principle that past price 
behaviour, rather than underlying fundamentals, determine the trading pattern remains valid.  
7  This exposition assumes that agents can realize their expectations and trade according to them.  7 
align financial asset prices to their underlying value 8. Again formally,  
*) ( ) ( 1 , t t t t f s s s E − − = Δ + ψ  (2) 
where * t s  stands for the fundamental exchange rate (De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006: 
15). The price dynamics is ultimately determined by the interaction between the two 
agents and the weight assigned to the respective trading rule. Formally,  
1 , , 1 *) ( + + + Δ + − − = Δ t t t c t t t f t s s s s ε β ω ψ ω  (3) 
where  t i, ω (i = f,c) is the respective share of fundamentalists and chartists (De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi 2006: 19). It is important to note that rather than two types of traders, the 
juxtaposition of ‘chartists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ is interpreted in terms of trading rules, 
which can be combined in one agent and prevail depending on market conditions and, 
more controversially, time horizon (Frankel and Froot 1990). In addition, it is probably 
also the case that different market participants follow different trading rules more often, 
which could have important implications for the regulation of financial markets.  
As De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) show in computer simulations, in such a scenario 
exchange rate dynamics can be characterized by two different kinds of equilibria: a 
fundamental equilibrium, in which fundamentalists and chartists co-exist and the former 
keep the exchange rate close to its fundamental value, and a bubble equilibrium 
characterized by the predominance of destabilizing chartists. In addition, the exchange 
rate is not only very often disconnected from its fundamental value, but also experiences 
more short-term volatility than the fundamental exchange rate and is occasionally 
subject to very large changes.  
3.2  Agents’ interactions  
Thus, an interesting question, especially for policy implications, is how the weight 
between the two trading rules is determined and what induces shifts between the 
fundamental and the bubble equilibrium. Several of the models which focus on 
heterogeneous traders point to the important interface between them and the risk the 
presence of noise traders creates for stabilizing arbitrageurs. Because, as we argued 
earlier (Nissanke 2005), the interaction between arbitrageurs and noise traders in 
currency markets is very complex, as the former often have to respond to the 
unpredictable behaviour of the latter rather than to expected changes in fundamentals. 
To determine the weight between chartists and fundamentalists, De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi 2006 (2006) assume that agents regularly compare the utility of the alternative 
trading rules and switch between them according to their relative risk adjusted 
                                                 
8  There are also models that only focus on one investor and not the interaction between heterogeneous 
traders (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998). For 
this paper and especially its policy implications the interaction between heterogeneous traders, 
however, is important. In addition, as Frankel and Froot (1990: 94) point out, the large volume of 
foreign exchange trading in itself suggests that market participants are not identical agents, who share 
the same rational expectations.  8 
profitability. If an initial shock in the exchange rate increases the profitability of 
extrapolative forecasting, an increasing share of traders will switch to this rule.  





t j t i
t i




=  (4) 
where  ) , , ( ´ c f j i j i = π  are the risk adjusted profits and γ measures the intensity with 
which the traders revise their forecast rule (De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006: 17).  
Similarly, Frankel and Froot (1990: 101) argue that the traders’ weight changes over 
time according to their respective wealth generated through the trading success. 
However, they do not explicitly consider the risk, which chartists’ behaviour could 
generate for stabilizing fundamentalists. Yet, de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006: 34) point 
out:  
Agents who use fundamentalists’ forecasting rules recognize that a profit 
opportunity arises when the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental 
value. However, because of the losses they incur and the large forecast 
errors they make during a bubble phase, these risk-averse 
fundamentalists switch to safer and more profitable forecasting rules. 
Arbitrage opportunities exist, but everybody is afraid to take these 
opportunities. 
The attempt to introduce rationality in the system through the ex post application of a 
fitness rule, however, seems to miss the essence of financial markets, which are 
inherently forward looking and driven by ex ante expectations.  
The role of risk is most explicit in de Long et al. (1990b: 705):‘Arbitrage does not 
eliminate the effects of noise because noise itself creates risk’. That is, the 
unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs and expectations, which can be erroneous and 
stochastic in light of fundamentals, could create a noise trader risk—a risk in the price 
of assets that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. This is 
because arbitrageurs are likely to be risk averse, acting with a short timehorizon. Hence, 
they tend to have limited willingness to take positions against risks created by noise 
traders. As a result, ‘prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in 
the absence of fundamental risk’ (de Long et al. 1990b: 705). Moreover, bearing a 
disproportionate amount of risk thus generated enables noise traders to earn a higher 
expected return than rational investors engaged in arbitrage against noise.  
3.3 Market  conditions 
As outlined above, exchange rate dynamics are the result of the complex interaction 
between noise traders and fundamentalists. This interaction, however, does not take 
place in a vacuum and the question arises whether and how ‘external’ market conditions 
can affect the interface between these two types of heterogeneous traders. As we argue 
earlier (Nissanke 2005), the market composition between the two types of traders shifts, 
as market conditions change. Equally, depending on market conditions, traders could 
switch their position from arbitrageurs to ‘destabilizing’ speculators. Hence, as de Long 
et al. (1990a, 1990b) note, the interface between arbitrageurs and noise traders is non-
linear.  9 
Thus, we argue that emphasis has to be placed on both, what we call objective and 
subjective market conditions. While objective market conditions refer to the role of 
fundamentals in shaping the interaction between heterogeneous traders, subjective 
market conditions point to the institutional framework which influences the 
(subjectively felt) risk parameter of traders and hence the predominance of one trading 
rule over the other.  
3.4  Objective market conditions  
For Jeanne and Rose (1999), the entry decision of noise traders is positively related to 
fundamental variance and a risk premium (exchange rate volatility). Their paper 
predicts that when the volatility of fundamentals is low, there is a single equilibrium 
where noise traders are not active, resulting in a low volatility in exchange rates. 
Conversely, when the volatility of fundamentals is high, a large number of noise traders 
enter the market, producing a high volatility in exchange rates. When the volatility of 
fundamentals is in the intermediate range, however, multiple stable equilibria are 
possible, depending on the number of noise traders seeking for a risk premium.  
According to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006: 28) once in a bubble equilibrium, the 
higher profitability of chartists continues to drive the exchange rate away from its 
fundamental value. This leaves the question open whether there are underlying market 
conditions, which favour the development of a bubble in the first place. They argue that 
the development of multiple equilibria is crucially dependent on initial conditions—
defined as an initial shock in the exchange rate. The larger the initial shock in the 
exchange rate, the more profitable the chartist trading rule and the farther the attractors 
are removed from the fundamental exchange rate. Hence, some sort of ‘underlying 
volatility’ is necessary to enter the economy in bubble equilibrium. However it remains 
indeterminate, what will determine the outcome in an ‘intermediate’ situation, as not 
any shock in the exchange rate has to result in a bubble equilibrium.  
Hence, both publications agree that some form of fundamental variance is necessary to 
make it profitable for noise traders to enter the market. However, both remain 
indeterminate as to the specification and identification of such fundamentals.  
The role of fundamentals is complex, theoretically as well as empirically, and is hardly 
dealt with in the behavioural finance literature. In other words while much emphasis is 
put on specifying the noise trader behaviour the theoretical assumptions about 
fundamentals remain unquestioned. They remain either firmly embedded in the 
monetary approach to exchange rate determination, or altogether unclear.9 However, if 
the expectations and behaviour of heterogeneous market players comes to the fore of the 
analysis and expectations cease to be formed rationally—in the sense that they are 
formed endogenously according to the model under consideration—there is little reason 
to expect a unique set of fundamentals to remain the permanent driver of exchange rate 
movements.  
                                                 
9  For example, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) never really define what they think fundamentalists 
base their assessment on. They mention either purchasing power parity (PPP) or some fundamental 
equilibrium rate (FEER) a la Williamson, but do not spend more consideration on this topic. However, 
this paper questions the assumption that foreign exchange traders have an equilibrium rate a la FEER 
in their mind.  10 
The fact that agents are heterogeneous and might use different models, across agent and 
time, to form expectations about future exchange rate values, has been acknowledged in 
mainstream exchange rate literature. One example is Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s 
(2004) interesting scapegoat model, where investors, due to confusion about the true 
source of exchange rate fluctuation, use fundamentals which show large imbalances as a 
‘scapegoat’ for exchange rate movements. In a similar vein, empirical literature has 
shown that the importance of fundamentals varies over time (e.g., Heimonen 2006). 
However, although the importance of financial market players in the determination of 
exchange rate dynamics is acknowledged, the same set of exchange rate fundamentals 
as specified in traditional exchange rate theory—mainly monetary variables—is 
maintained.  
Post-Keynesian literature (see e.g., Davidson 2002a, 2002b; Alvés, Ferrari-Filho and de 
Paula 2000) has long criticized the assumption of an ergodic world, where underlying 
fundamentals can be calculated from past data, projected in the future and hence firmly 
pinned down by (if only a few) fundamentalists. In Keynes’ world of fundamental 
uncertainty, expectations and convention—the assumption that ‘the existing state of 
affairs will continue indefinitely’,—and the psychological confidence with which we 
hold this convention govern investment behaviour (Keynes 1997: 152). However, if 
convention determines current market prices, foreseeing future convention and hence 
market psychology becomes crucial to maintain the value of one’s portfolio (Keynes 
1997: 155). It is not merely the short-horizon and risk created for rational arbitrageurs 
or the presence of ‘dumb’ feedback traders, but the underlying uncertainty, and lack of a 
‘true’ anchor to the price system, which causes Keynes ‘beauty contest’. 
Although we agree with the assumption of fundamental uncertainty, the importance of 
expectations and the state of confidence in the determination of exchange rate 
movements, we suggest that it is theoretically unsatisfactory to reject the notion of 
fundamentals per se. Indeed, if the expectations and behaviour of asset market players 
are acknowledged to be the driving factors of exchange rate movements, an attempt has 
to be made to understand the formation of these expectations and the motivations of 
asset holders. This has to go beyond the current set of mainstream fundamentals and 
specify alternative fundamentals, which are found to drive investors’ behaviour.10 
3.5  Subjective market conditions: a case for exchange rate policy  
In addition to fundamental risk, we argue that the interaction between stabilizing and 
destabilizing traders will be influenced by subjective market conditions—or the 
institutional setting—which influence the risk perception of market players. Probably 
the most important institutional setting in this sense is the exchange rate regime in 
place.  
Now, in Jeanne and Rose’s (1999) noise trader model, the entry decision of noise 
traders is positively related to a risk premium (exchange rate volatility), which itself is 
generated through the entry of noise traders in the market. Hence, similar to self-
fulfilling crisis models the expectation of a higher risk premium is validated through the 
resulting entrance of noise traders as it changes the structure of risks and returns in a 
way that makes it more attractive for other noise traders to join. Similarly, in De 
                                                 
10 Although not discussed in this paper, we deal this issue within our current research programme.  11 
Grauwe and Grimaldi’s (2006) model, exchange rate behaviour is crucially determined 
by the risk aversion parameter of fundamentalists.11 A fall in this parameter 
(subjectively perceived or objectively determined) induces fundamentalists to bet more 
aggressively against destabilizing noise traders and maintains the exchange rate in a 
fundamental equilibrium.  
However, the view that exchange rate behaviour is determined by the interaction of 
heterogeneous traders, rather than directly by macroeconomic fundamentals, and that 
this interaction is fundamentally shaped by a subjectively felt risk perception, has 
important implications for exchange rate policy. Market structure has to be endogenized 
rather than taken as given and can be changed through government policy, which 
influences trading behaviour and/or the composition of traders operating in the market. 
In this view, a stabilized exchange rate does not transmit into higher fundamental 
volatility, but delivers stability ‘at not cost’ as market conditions and hence market 
structure change. 
For Jeanne and Rose, the monetary authority’s announcement to prevent exchange rate 
volatility is enough to deter destabilizing noise traders seeking for a risk premium and 
pins down the economy on the low volatility equilibrium. Although the stable exchange 
rate commitment constrains the monetary policy response function out of equilibrium, in 
equilibrium there is no observable sacrifice of monetary autonomy.12 The implication 
that the exchange rate regime in place effectively changes market structure is also 
analysed in Flood and Rose (1999). In their model, the process governing the exchange 
rate changes according to expectations about future exchange rate volatility. They show 
that in periods where expected volatility is non-zero—such as in a floating regime or 
non-credibly fixed pegged exchange rate regime—forces other than those from money 
and goods markets come to determine the exchange rate.  
Although Jeanne and Rose argue that their definition of stable exchange rates is flexible 
enough to encompass a wide spectrum of exchange rate regimes, it is probably most 
interesting in the context of the stabilizing properties of intermediate exchange rate 
regimes, such as target zones or Williamson’s (2000) basket band crawl (BBC) 
proposition.  
Williamson (2000) recommends the intermediate ‘target zone’ regime, governed by the 
BBC rule, as a more appropriate exchange rate regime for most emerging market 
economies in preference over one of the two-corner solutions of pure floating or hard 
pegs. He lists the fundamental reasons found in literature for preferring a band system 
over floating: (i) the band performs the function of crystallizing market expectations of 
where the equilibrium exchange rate may lay, and thus making expectations stabilizing 
at the time-horizons relevant for influencing market behaviour (Svensson 1992); (ii) a 
band has a pronounced effect in limiting exchange rate variability by preventing noise 
                                                 
11  De Grauwe and Grimaldi dedicate nearly an entire chapter to this parameter and perform simulations 
how it affects exchange rate dynamics. They show that a reduced risk aversion by fundamentalists 
avoids bubble equilibria and pins down the economy at a ‘good’ equilibrium. However, 
disappointingly, the authors do not use this parameter to derive implications for exchange rate policy. 
12 The authors argue that their ‘announcement effect’ is stronger than Krugman’s (1991) ‘honeymoon’ 
effect, where the exchange rate is stabilized by the promise of interventions that have to be fulfilled in 
equilibrium (Jeanne and Rose 1999).  12 
traders, particularly, stop-loss traders from making money by introducing noise into the 
exchange market (Rose 1996).Hence, in contrast to the traditional target zone literature 
(Krugman 1991), target zones in this view are not stabilizing, because agents are 
rational (‘honeymoon effect’), but because it makes market expectations more rational 
as it is more difficult for irrational traders to survive in an environment with little 
volatility (Jeanne and Rose 1999).13  
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) arrive at a similar conclusion, although in their model 
rather than building ex  ante credibility, the existence of a target zone increases the 
profitability of fundamentalist trading ex post as it strengthens the mean-reverting 
behaviour of the exchange rate. Although the authors stress the sustainability of foreign 
exchange reserves, we suggest that their reactive theory understates the cost of 
defending the currency in the case of a speculative attack and/or the opportunity costs of 
holding a large stock of foreign exchange reserves. In addition, in this regard, we should 
bear in mind, under conditions of self-fulfilling crises such as those examined in the 
second-generation model of currency crises (Obstfeld 1996), the issue at stake is not 
merely whether speculators increase exchange rate volatility, but also whether they 
generate and exacerbate exchange rate misalignments in terms of fundamentals. These 
deviations, however, (even if only temporary) can have devastating macroeconomic 
effects.  
Hence, we argue that the interesting aspect of a target zone would be its ability to build 
ex ante credibility, which drives destabilizing noise traders from the market and makes 
costly intervention on the margins unnecessary. As stressed by ‘self-fulfilling’ crisis 
models, the crisis mechanism works through speculators’ expectations of the choices the 
government would make in a tight crisis situation (e.g., Obstfeld 1996). If exchange rate 
volatility is not credibly contained, noise traders will not be impeded to enter the 
market. 
In this sense, one could argue that the government’s firm commitment to defend the 
exchange rate band lowers the (subjectively felt) risk aversion of fundamentalists, 
encouraging them to bet more aggressively against destabilizing chartists.14  
4  Empirical analysis: the study of Brazil  
4.1 Empirical  prelude   
There is extensive empirical evidence that the exchange rate seems to be unrelated to its 
fundamentals implied by macroeconomic theory. Probably the most prominent paper in 
                                                 
13  This argument is very similar to Krugman and Miller (1993), where a target zone forestalls currency 
crashes by keeping the exchange rate below the threshold that triggers stop-loss trading. The 
stabilizing properties of an exchange rate band system, through driving destabilizing noise traders 
from the system, have also been expressed by Williamson (1983).  
14  That having been said, given emerging markets’ position in a hierarchic international monetary system 
the need to build credibility might require a partial withdrawal from the impossible trinity through the 
temporary restriction on capital movements (for a concrete proposal in this direction see Nissanke 
2005). This might also have implications for the design of the band system—an issue we are aiming to 
address in our current research programme.  13 
this direction is Meese and Rogoff (1983), who show that a simple random walk has 
more predictive power of future exchange rate behaviour than any structural model.15 In 
a similar vein, Flood and Rose (1999) document that exchange rate volatility is 
‘excessive’ in relation to the volatility of underlying fundamentals (money growth and 
interest rates).  
Not only have fundamentals little predictive power for exchange rate behaviour, it has 
also been shown that exchange rates react unpredictably to news about those 
fundamentals (e.g., Goodhart 1988; Goodhart and Figliuoli 1991). Interesting for this 
paper is the result by Andersen et al. (2003), who find that announcement effects are 
asymmetric (bad news have stronger effects than good news) and seem to be a function 
of the state of uncertainty in the economy.  
Empirical evidence that exchange rate stabilization could come at ‘no cost’ has been 
convincingly presented by Flood and Rose (1995) and Baxter and Stockman (1989). 
The authors show that despite increased real exchange rate volatility under flexible 
exchange rates, they find no systematic differences in the behaviour of macroeconomic 
aggregates under alternative exchange rate arrangements.  
Due to the difficulty to identify and quantify exchange rate fundamentals an extensive 
share of empirical literature has concentrated on the timeseries properties of exchange 
rates and discovered anomalies, which stand in stark contrast to the efficient market 
rational expectations view of foreign exchange markets.16 First, there is widely 
documented evidence that exchange rate returns are not normally distributed and are 
subject to heteroscedasticity. While the first is evidence of large ‘excessive’ spikes in 
the exchange rate, ARCH effects support the hypothesis of multiple equilibria, where 
periods of exchange rate tranquillity alternate with periods of turbulence (e.g., de 
Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006: 5). Of special interest for this paper is the finding by Bauer 
and Herz (2005), who show that exchange rate trends—representing chartist behaviour 
—result in higher exchange rate volatility, giving some support to the results presented 
in Jeanne and Rose (2002).  
The predictability of returns in the presence of price trends has led many to test the 
interesting implication that chartism/technical trading is profitable and survives for long 
periods. And indeed, results tend to favour the hypothesis that chartism is on average 
profitable and evolutionary stable (e.g., Neely 1997; Schulmeister 2006).  
Finally, there is substantial survey evidence on the formation of expectations and 
alternative trading rules in foreign exchange markets. Frankel (1996), for example, 
reports that traders, using the ‘chartist technical analysis’ or the ‘momentum’ models, 
act on extrapolative expectations at short horizons under three months, while they act on 
adaptive, regressive or distributed lag expectations at longer horizons of three months to 
                                                 
15  Recent empirical work based on cointegration techniques argues that while insignificant in the short 
run, macroeconomic fundamentals seem to determine the exchange rate in the long run (e.g., Mark 
1995). In addition, adjustment (to the fundamentals) might be nonlinear (e.g., Kilian and Taylor 
2001).  
16    Another large strand of literature, which points to the fact that exchange rate markets are not 
populated by rationally optimizing agents, focuses on uncovered interest parity and ‘its failure’ to hold 
empirically. For an overview, see Lewis (1995) and for a model, which tries to account for this 
‘puzzle’ through the presence of noise traders, see Mark and Wu (1998).  14 
one year. Hence, he suggests that the former generates destabilizing speculations, while 
the latter produces stabilizing effects. In a similar vein, Cheung and Wong (2000) report 
survey evidence on Asian foreign exchange markets, that short-term variability is 
largely attributed to non-economic forces including bandwagon effects, overreaction to 
news, speculation and technical trading, while fundamental trading dominates over 
longer horizon. In general, survey evidence (see also Allen and Taylor 1992; Menkhoff 
1997) reports that technical trading is an important complement to fundamental 
analysis, used to forecast market psychology and often acting in a self-fulfilling manner, 
detracting from fundamental analysis. Interestingly, Spahn (2002) notes that chartists 
may be found more among institutional investors such as investment fund managers, 
rather than dealers-arbitrageurs. These empirical observations point to the importance of 
distinguishing those who act as arbitrageurs from those whose behaviour tends to be 
speculative, pushing markets away from equilibrium.  
4.2 Hypotheses   
The theoretical considerations above have two major implications for exchange rate 
behaviour. First, it is argued that floating exchange rates are subject to multiple 
equilibria, where fundamental equilibria alternate with bubble equilibria, in which 
destabilizing noise traders drive the exchange rate away from its ‘equilibrium’ level. 
Second, it has been argued that the credible commitment to a target zone stabilizes the 
exchange rate ‘at not cost’ by driving destabilizing noise traders from the market and 
lowering the risk (perception) of stabilizing traders. Although preliminary results of the 
existence of multiple equilibria are presented, the primary focus of this paper’s 
empirical work is on the stabilizing effect of a credible target zone.  
In general, empirical evidence has not been too kind to Krugman’s (1991) original 
target zone model, where the expectation of intervention at the margin should make 
speculators act in a stabilizing way and induce mean-reverting behaviour in the 
exchange rate (Svensson 1992: 125f). However, recent empirical evidence shows that 
exchange rate policy can have an important effect on the formation of expectations. 
Jeanne and Rose (2002) show that managed exchange rate regimes have lower forecast 
dispersion and fewer deviations from uncovered interest parity than floating regimes. 
Williamson (2000: 23) points out that forward rates normally change by less than spot 
rates in target zones, indicating the presence of mean-reverting expectations.  
4.3 Methodology 
Due to the difficulty to correctly identify and quantify the underlying exchange rate 
fundamentals—not to speak of its equilibrium rate—this paper primarily bases itself on 
observed timeseries behaviour. More concretely, it analyses the simple serial correlation 
pattern in exchange rate returns implied by the theoretical models presented above. To 
do so, it applies Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) heteroscedasticity robust variance ratio 
test, extended by Chow and Denning’s (1993) multiple variance ratio test (MVR).17  
                                                 
17  The serial correlation tests in this paper are joint tests so that no serial correlation is present at any 
lagged return under consideration. In this context, however, it has been argued that it is inappropriate 
to focus on the significance of individual variance ratios without controlling for the joint test size, as 
this could give rise to the problem of multiple comparisons among test statistics, which causes an 15 
Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988: 43) variance ratio test exploits the fact that without serial 
correlation in returns, the variance of the increments should be linear in the sampling 
interval. In other words, if a series  t X  is uncorrelated, the variance of its q-differences 
would be q times the variance of its first differences. Formally,  
) ( ) ( 1 − − − = − t t q t t X X qVar X X Var  (5) 


























And the test statistic 
1 ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ − ≡ q R V q M r  (7) 
Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation,  1 ) ( = q V . The authors derive the 
asymptotic distribution of the estimated variance ratios and calculate two test-statistics, 
Z(q) and Z*(q). While the former tests for homoscedastic uncorrelated increments the 
latter controls for time varying variance, heteroscedasticity, in returns.18 Under the null 
hypothesis the test statistic follows a standard null distribution. Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) further show that  ) ( ˆ q M r is asymptotically equal to a weighted sum of 
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hence for q = 2  
) 1 ( ˆ 1 ) 2 ( ˆ ) 2 ( ˆ ρ
a
r R V M = − =  (9) 
Where  ) 1 ( ˆ ρ  is approximately the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the 
differences (p. 48).  
Using a Monte Carlo experiment Lo and MacKinlay (1989) show that under the 
heteroscedasticity null (the asset price follows a martingale) the variance ratio test is 
more powerful than the Box Pierce Q-statistic.19 In addition, Poterba and Summers 
                                                                                                                                               
inappropriately large probability of Type I error. Chow and Denning’s (1993) MVR test attempts to 
control for this problem by applying higher critical values to the maximum absolute value of a set of 
Lo and MacKinlay’s test statistics. For a more detailed exposition of methodology and critical values, 
see Smith, Jefferis and Ryoo (2002) and the Appendix.  
18  For exact methodology and derivation of test-statistics, please see Appendix.  
19 The lack of power of the Q-statistic in the presence of heteroscedasticity might be especially severe in 
the case of foreign exchange rates, which have been shown to be subject to considerable ARCH 
effects (e.g., Engle, Ito and Lin 1990). Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) further point out that the 16 
(1988) find that variance ratio tests have slightly higher power than regression-based 
tests for serial correlation.  
As outlined in the theoretical section, one common way to formalize destabilizing noise 
trader behaviour is through the use of simple trading rules, such as positive feedback 
trading or trend chasing, where past prices are extrapolated into the future. This, in turn 
should result in short-run positive serial correlation in returns. Although this 
methodology uses a very simplified version of noise trading, it should allow identifying 
periods of sustained exchange rate trends, caused by chartism or even stronger herding 
and panic in financial crises, where investors only trade on the currency’s past—
weakening—value. While evidence of short-run momentum seems to be relatively 
robust in stock markets, evidence is mixed for the foreign exchange market (e.g., Fong, 
Koh and Ouliaris 1997; Lee, Liu and Pan 2001).  
A second strand of literature has focused on long-run dependencies in asset returns. For 
example, Poterba and Summers (1988) show that the correlation in returns turns 
negative as the horizon increases and attribute this mean-reverting behaviour to 
departures from fundamental values through noise traders and the eventual correction of 
‘erroneous’ market moves (ibid.: 28). Mean-reverting behaviour in the exchange rate 
has been primarily tested on the basis of unit root tests. This strand of empirical 
literature has largely concluded that shocks to the exchange rate are permanent and 
rejected the hypothesis that the exchange rate is a stationary mean-reverting process 
(e.g., Takagi 1988).  
This paper attempts to combine the two approaches presented above. Destabilizing 
noise trading is operationalized as simple positive feedback trading, which results in 
short-run positive serial correlation and momentum in returns. In addition, it is 
conjectured that if an ‘overshooting of the overshooting’ in response to a shock to the 
exchange rate takes place, positive serial correlation in the short run should be followed 
by some form of mean reversion or negative serial correlation in the long run20. 
In order to test for multiple equilibria the paper applies a methodology used by Yilmaz 
(2003) and Kim (2004), where moving subsamples of fixed window size are applied to 
the exchange rate series. This methodology allows distinguishing between the different 
dynamics of the exchange rate series and—with some precision—identifying the 
structural breaks and switch to a different equilibrium.  
One important caveat to this methodology, however, is that there are several possible 
alternative explanations for autocorrelation in exchange rate returns. While non-
synchronous trading is judged less prevalent in foreign exchange markets, official 
intervention and a time-varying risk premium have been advanced as possible 
explanations for the observed autocorrelation.21 Finally and more fundamentally, 
                                                                                                                                               
power of the Q-statistic will be critically affected by the order of autocorrelations included, which 
could impede detecting the presence of higher order serial correlation.  
20 The same conjecture is also tested in Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990), who find significant 
evidence of short-run serial correlation in excess exchange rate returns, followed by mean reversion in 
the long run.  
21 Indeed, it has been argued that price deviations from the random walk (martingale) do not by 
themselves imply market inefficiency, but can result from shifting risk premia which are consistent 17 
foreign exchange behaviour cannot be analysed detached from underlying fundamentals 
and the analysis of timeseries behaviour can only yield partial results.  
The second and main hypothesis presented in this paper is that a credibly managed 
exchange rate regime—especially in the form of a target zone or crawling band—
anchors convention, and drives destabilizing noise traders from the system. As a result, 
the exchange rate should fluctuate around the band’s parity.  
Following Myrvin and MacDonald (1998) rather than focusing on exchange rate 
expectations, this paper directly tests the presence of mean reversion. As regressive 
expectations dominate ‘normal’ overshooting à la Dornbusch (1976) and hence short-
run negative serial correlation should dominate.  
Again, one important caveat to this methodology is that the focus on serial correlation 
patterns does not allow controlling for other causes of the observed timeseries 
behaviour. More concretely, it does not allow distinguishing between stabilizing trading 
and ‘leaning against the wind’ official exchange rate intervention by the central bank. 
However, although intervention in a target zone should be limited to the margin—or 
unnecessary overall, due to the honeymoon effect—intramarginal intervention has been 
a widespread phenomenon (Svensson 1992).  
4.4 Results   
The country analysed in this study is Brazil. This choice was motivated by several 
reasons: First, the focus is on the emerging countries with a certain degree of economic 
and financial development and integration in international financial markets. Brazil is 
among the emerging countries with the most developed financial market, where asset 
market considerations play an important role in the determination of exchange rate 
behaviour. Second, Brazil introduced a narrow band around the real on 6th March 1995 
which was maintained until the financial crisis at the beginning of 1999. Since then the 
central bank of Brazil has followed an inflation-targeting regime, where the exchange 
rate should only enter the central bank’s objective function if it has an effect on 
inflation. This allows analysing exchange rate behaviour under two very distinct 
exchange rate regimes. Finally, Brazil’s current floating exchange rate regime is 
characterized by substantial volatility, which could give interesting clues for the 
analysis of agents’ behaviour in emerging countries foreign exchange markets.22  
The series used is the daily, nominal spot rate to the US$ dollar, provided by Reuters 
through the financial statistical database Datastream. Exchange rate returns are 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the first difference of the nominal exchange rate 
series. Days with missing data have been deleted.  
                                                                                                                                               
with efficient markets (e.g., Leroy 1973; Lucas 1978). In this context, however, Goodhart (1988) 
argues that ‘without an explicit theory of why there is such a premium and why it varies, it has not 
function but tautologically to save the theory’ (Mankiw and Summers 1984; Goodhart 1988). In 
addition, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that observed asset price changes seem too excessive to 
be accounted for by a changing risk premium.  
22    However, these characteristics are not exclusive for Brazil and indeed in our current research 
programme we also analyse other emerging markets such as Chile, Indonesia and Thailand. Results 
are available upon request.  18 
Figure 1 shows nominal exchange rate behaviour over the two distinct exchange rate 
regimes. While relative nominal exchange rate stability during the crawling band regime 
found its end in a financial crisis at the end of 1998, the subsequent ‘floating’ period has 
been characterized by two distinct trends: a sustained period of depreciation until the 
beginning of 2003 and a recent appreciation trend. In addition, the years between 2001 
and 2003 are characterized by high volatility or even crisis.23  
Figure 1 
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Source: Datastream. 
Table 1 
Preliminary statistical indicators for band and floating period, Brazil  
 Band  Float 
  6 March 1995 until 
12 January 1999 
2 February 1999 to 
23 July 2007 
Mean 0.00034  -0.00003 
SD 0.00179  0.01026 
Skewness 3.332683*  -5.5459 
Kurtosis 50.50642*  19.93752* 
Jar-Be 96558.16*  26526.63* 
Q(1) 0.32  18.884 
Q(6) 10.03  72.687 
Q(12) 79.68*  77.844* 
No. of obs  1007  2210 
 
Note:  *indicates rejection of 0.05 level. 
                                                 
23  An obvious and important caveat to this section is the presence of ‘fear of floating’. Despite a de jure 
exchange rate regime of a free float, several authors (e.g., Calvo and Reinhart 2000; Levy-Yeyvati and 
Sturzenegger 2002) have shown that countries significantly manage their exchange rates. This 
evidence is partly confirmed by data on foreign exchange market intervention by the Brazilian central 
bank and highlights the importance of considering this important actor when analysing exchange rate 
behaviour.  19 
Table 1 presents preliminary statistics about the difference in exchange rate behaviour 
between the band and floating exchange rate regime.  
Several points seem noteworthy. First, while the Brazilian real depreciated during the 
managed regime, the floating period is characterized by an appreciating currency. 
Second, and expectedly, the volatility, as measured in terms of standard deviation, is 
substantially higher in the floating regime. Third, deviations from normality are even 
more pronounced in the managed exchange rate regime. Finally, and probably most 
interestingly for this study, the managed exchange rate regime seems to be characterized 
by less autocorrelation in returns than the floating period. Although the evidence on 
ARCH effects is slightly less marked in the managed regime, this does not seem to fully 
explain the reduction in autocorrelation.  
We have argued in this paper that floating exchange rate regimes are characterized by 
multiple equilibria, where calm periods alternate with periods during which 
destabilizing noise traders deviate the exchange rate from its ‘equilibrium value’. 
Destabilizing noise trading is operationalized as simple positive feedback trades, 
resulting in short-run positive serial correlation. Hence, in the presence of multiple 
equilibria, periods of no or insignificant serial correlation should alternate with periods 
of significant return dependency. We have further argued that in the presence of 
destabilizing noise traders which cause the exchange rate to overshoot, a period of 
positive serial correlation should be followed by long-run mean-reverting behaviour.  
Finally, the stabilizing properties of exchange rate band systems should result in 
negatively correlated exchange rate returns as destabilizing noise traders are deterred 
from the market.  
In order to test these hypotheses, and derive some indications about the differential 
exchange rate behaviour in alternative exchange rate regimes, Lo and MacKinlay’s 
variance ratio test is applied to a fixed size moving sub-sample. The window size is 
chosen at 512 observations.24 As the focus is on short-run serial correlation only lags of 
2, 5 and 10 are considered.25 In Figures 2 and 3, Chow and Denning’s (1993) adjusted 
critical values are reported.  
Figures 2 and 3 present our results. Several points are noteworthy. First, there seems to 
be preliminary support for our hypothesis of differing exchange rate dynamics, 
depending on the exchange rate regime in place. As can be seen from the variance ratio 
in Figure 3, a period of negative serial correlation during Brazil’s band systems is 
followed by positive serial correlation during the floating period. This evidence is 
especially strong for the short-run serial correlation separated by one lag (V (2)).  
Second, it is evident that the inclusion of the crisis days in the moving sample results in 
a considerable jump in the test statistic and significant correlation in exchange rate 
                                                 
24 Chow and Denning show that for a sample size of above and equal 512, the power of the multiple 
variance ratio test is comparable with the ADF and PP test for a unit root against an AR(1) process 
and much more powerful against an ARIMA (1,1,1) and ARIMA (1,1,0). Furthermore, choosing a 
larger sample size could mask important exchange rate dynamics and structural breaks. 
25  Sensitivity tests were applied and lags above 20 were hardly ever significant. In addition, the decision 
to restrict results to three variables was motivated to maintain the clarity of results.  20 
returns. This in turn could point to the fact that the devaluation of the currency and 
increased risk environment drove stabilizing fundamentalists from the market, while 
‘irrational’ feedback traders moved the currency away from its fundamental value.  
Figure 2 
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V(2) V(5) V(10) 1  
Notes:    X-axis denotes the starting period of the moving sample; Results have been tested for 
robustness to outliers in the data; Large spikes in the results have been removed from the graph 
for clarity. Only heteroscedasticity robust critical values are reported; Standard normal 0.05 
critical value 1.96; Chow and Denning (1993) 0.1 critical value 2.23 and 0.05 critical value 2.49.  
Source:   Datastream for exchange rate; variance ratio best based on authors’ own calculations. 21 
Third, the current floating exchange rate regime is characterized by at least one period 
of significant positive autocorrelation. This provides strong preliminary support for the 
hypothesis of multiple equilibria.26 However, there are two main caveats to this result. 
First, they are incomplete. As outlined above, the analysis of timeseries behaviour 
detached from ‘fundamentals’ or the risk environment has little explanatory power. 
Rather than knowing that there are changing equilibria, it would be crucial to analyse 
why  and  under what market conditions this change takes place. Second, there is a 
problem of identification. Although the methodology of a moving sub-sample can locate 
structural breaks and periods of different market behaviour, it is difficult to determine 
the exact switch between the equilibria.27  
Fourth, one has to be clear about how to interpret these results. The methodology 
presented above might not be able to discover noise traders or technical trading, which 
are based on exploiting short-term trends in the data and contribute to higher volatility 
in exchange rates.28 However, it shows that the interaction between heterogeneous 
traders in foreign exchange markets and/or the uncertainty about a ‘true’ underlying 
value can give rise to periods of speculative bubbles, characterized by feedback trading 
(possibly the result of herding), driving the exchange rates away from its underlying 
value.29  
Table 2 confirms our results obtained from the moving sample application.  
First, although not significant, it shows that while variance ratios for the floating period 
are all higher than one, indicating positive serial correlation, they are below one during 
the band system. This in turn could confirm our hypothesis of mean-reverting behaviour 
in target zones, as destabilizing noise traders are deterred from the system. However, as 
also previously mentioned, this methodology cannot distinguish between stabilizing 
trading and ‘leaning against the wind’ policies by the central bank. Hence, in order to 
obtain a full picture of exchange rate dynamics, the above results would have to be seen 
in conjunction with foreign exchange intervention. 
Second, it is interesting to note that the inclusion of the crisis days in the variance ratio 
tests leads to significant positive serial correlation in returns and a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. In other words, if taking the crisis years under consideration 
positive serial correlation is followed by mean-reverting behaviour. This in turn could 
serve as strong evidence that in the crisis destabilizing noise traders drove the exchange 
                                                 
26 The period of significant serial correlation seems to coincide with the financial turmoil around the 
election of President Lula and (unwarranted) fears about a change in economic policy ‘to the left’. In 
addition, concerns about the large domestic debt and the future of IMF assistance contributed to the 
uncertainty.  
27 Attempts to locate such a ‘switching point’ have been made through the use of fixed endpoints. 
However, although this procedure helps to locate the switch more precisely, results are not robust, due 
to the varying sample size. Again, results are available on request.  
28 An identification of these phenomena would probably require higher frequency data and a more detail 
study of ‘events’. 
29 This caveat is also warranted given the reduction in positive serial correlation at the end of the sample, 
despite an obvious and continuous appreciation trend. The authors would conjecture this is due to the 
intermittent volatility in exchange rate behaviour, whose origin is subject to current research.  22 
rate away from its underlying value, as the increasing risk environment deterred 
stabilizing arbitrageurs from the market.  
Table 2 
Variance ratio tests for band and floating period  
      q = 2  q = 5  q = 10  q = 20  ADF 
Float Excluding  crisis  V(q)  1.0903 1.0132 0.9769 1.0314  -0.96741 
    Z*(q)  1.511  0.0989 -0.1218 0.1303 0.7666 
 Including  crisis  V(q)  1.1215 1.0822 1.0213  0.974  -2.993726
   Z*(q)  2.0757*  0.6299  0.112  -0.1046  0.0356 
       
Band   V(q)  0.858  0.751 0.771 0.465  -7.250655
    Z*(q)    -1.659 -1.370 -0.857 -1.328  0 
Note:  *significant at 5% level according to standard normal (0.05 critical value is 1.96) 
5 Concluding  remarks 
There have been intense debates among policymakers as well as academics what could 
be appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies in a world of free 
capital mobility. The paper aims at contributing to this discourse by presenting the case 
for an intermediate exchange rate regime. While macroeconomic literature has so far 
conducted theoretical and empirical discussions in relation to the infamous proposition 
of ‘impossible trinity thesis’, this paper attempted to examine the case for an 
intermediate regime from a microeconomic perspective, drawing on recent theoretical 
and empirical literatures on behavioural finance and currency market structures. 
Thus, in this paper, exchange rate dynamics are analysed, not as a result of market 
equilibrating forces, but as one resulting from changing expectations and behaviour of 
heterogeneous traders in currency markets, in particular from complex, non-linear 
interactions of destabilizing noise trading and stabilizing fundamentalists. In our 
analysis, a distinction between noise trading based on chartism/momentum trading 
(chartists) and trading based on economic fundamentals (fundamentalists) is made, not 
in terms of two distinct types of trading agents operating in markets, but in terms of 
trading rules, which can be combined in one agent and can prevail depending on market 
conditions. Seen from this perspective, it is shown that markets are characterized by two 
different kinds of equilibria: a fundamental equilibrium, where the exchange rate is kept 
close to its fundamental value, and a bubble equilibrium, where destabilizing noise 
trading dominates. It is conjectured that as a market condition shifts from the former to 
the latter, the exchange rate becomes disconnected from its fundamental value and 
experiences higher short-term volatility than fundamentals warrant.  
We argued in this context that the interaction between heterogeneous trading strategies 
is not placed in a vacuum, but influenced by what we refer to as objective and subjective 
market conditions. In this context, the exchange rate regime is viewed as the most 
important institutional setting, wherein subjectively and objectively perceived risk 
parameters are determined, which in turn shape the interaction between stabilizing and 
destabilizing trading strategies. While leaving a fuller analysis of objective market 
conditions, i.e., fundamentals and their effects on exchange rate dynamics to our future 
research agenda, this paper focused on the role of subjective market conditions in 
shaping the critical interface between heterogeneous traders. These in turn, we argued, 
will critically depend on the particular exchange rate regime in operation, which will 23 
shape the behaviour of foreign exchange market participants and effectively change 
market structure. For example, a credible exchange rate regime in the form of target 
zones or Williamson’s BBC regime (basket, band and crawl) will impede destabilizing 
noise traders to enter the market, and hence will stabilize exchange rates at no cost.  
We applied our theoretical conjectures to an empirical study of Brazil’s foreign 
exchange market. Brazil switched from a managed band regime to market-based 
floating regime after experiencing a speculative currency attack at the end of 1998. 
Since then the central bank has followed an inflation-targeting regime, under which 
exchange rate movements should only enter the bank’s objective function if at odds 
with its inflation target. As a result, its current floating exchange rate regime has been 
characterized by substantial volatility. With our comparative empirical analysis of 
Brazil’s foreign exchange market under different exchange rate regimes we thus aimed 
at acquiring some valuable insights into how foreign exchange markets are structured 
and performed in an era of financial globalization, as the outcome of interactive forces 
among heterogeneous market traders/participants as well as between market traders on 
the one hand and the central bank on the other.  
Our analysis of exchange rate dynamics with explicitly endogenizing market structures 
could have important implications for exchange rate policy. While mainstream 
economics has settled on the two corner consensus, policymakers in emerging countries 
acknowledge the need for an intermediate exchange rate regime, which provides 
stability while leaving enough flexibility to react to internal and external shocks and 
adjust to changing structural characteristics. However, although acknowledging the 
importance of stabilized exchange rates, policymakers shy away from any renewed 
institutional commitment to an exchange rate target due to the fear of speculative 
attacks. Hence, existing de facto pegs are supported by a war-chest of foreign exchange 
reserves which aim to prevent a run on the currency. However, as has been argued in 
this paper institutional commitment will be crucial to change foreign exchange market 
structures and effectively drive destabilizing noise traders from the system. The credible 
commitment to an exchange rate band should make the holding of large reserves for 
self-insurance purposes unnecessary and allow investing valuable foreign exchange 
reserves into productive projects.  
While this paper focused on the importance of subjective market conditions in shaping 
exchange rate dynamics, a deeper understanding of exchange rate behaviour will need a 
critical analysis of objective market conditions, or so-called fundamentals. Although 
touched upon only briefly in the present paper, we suggest that an analysis of 
motivations and behaviour of asset market players incorporating a fuller study of 
fundamentals will allow us to further deepen our knowledge of how markets function 
under different exchange rate regimes. This will also require a thorough consideration 
of the role of the central bank in the price formation process. Finally, although the 
analysis of exchange rate dynamics provided preliminary evidence on the existence of 
noise trading, research effort has to be directed towards identifying the specific actors 
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Appendix: Variance ratio tests  
A1  Lo and MacKinlay Variance ratio test  
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The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard normal test-statistic,  ) ( * q Z is then given by  
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A2  Chow and Denning’s multiple variance ratio tests  
The serial correlation tests presented in the paper are joint tests that no serial correlation 
is present at any lagged return under consideration. In essence, a set of multiple 
subhypotheses  
0 ) ( : 0 = i r i q M H  for  i = 1,2,….m  (10) 
0 ) ( : 1 ≠ i r i q M H  for  any  i = 1,2,…..,m  (11) 
is tested.  
In this context it has been argued that it is inappropriate to focus on the significance of 
individual variance ratios without controlling for the joint test size. This could give rise 
to the problem of multiple comparisons among test statistics, which in turn causes an 
inappropriately large probability of Type I error (Chow and Denning 1993).  
The authors propose a multiple variance ratio (MVR) test, based on the maximum 
absolute value of a set of Lo and MacKinlay’s test statistics, and studentized maximum 
modulus (SMM) critical values to control for the overall test size and define a joint 
confidence interval for the variance ratio estimates. The core of their test is based on the 
result  
() [] α α − ≥ ≤ 1 ) ; ; ( ) ( ,..., ) ( max 1 T m SMM q Z q Z PR m  (12) 
in which  ) ; ; ( T m SMM α is the upper α point of the SMM distribution with parameters m 
and T (sample size) degrees of freedom.  
Asymptotically, when T is finite 31 
2 * ) ; ; ( a Z m SMM = ∞ α  (13) 
If the maximum absolute value of either Z(q) or Z*(q) is greater than the SMM critical 
value at a predetermined significance level, then the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in any of the returns considered is rejected (see also Smith, Jefferis and 
Ryoo 2002).  
Critical values  
SMM(α,m,∞)    
   m 
α  3 4 5 
0.1  2.11 2.23 2.31 
0.05  2.39 2.49 2.57 
0.01  2.93 3.01 3.09 
Source:   Smith (2007). 
 